Water in Indo-Pak Diplomacy
By Dr Arvind Kumar*
President, India Water Foundation, New Delhi.
[Recent years have witnessed water emerging as a hot issue between India and Pakistan relations. Pakistan is averse to India taking advantage of Indus Rivers emanating from Kashmir by building hydro-electric dams on these rivers and accuses India of stealin water meant for Pakistan under the terms of Indus Water Treaty of 1960. India’s refutation of Pakistani allegations remain unheeded by Islamabad and it is insistent upon using water as a ‘tool’ to denounce India. Ed. ]
Water is becoming a progressively scarce and fluctuating resource in view of burgeoning population, growing food demand and climate change. Accordingly, there has been an increasing competition between countries vis-à-vis their right to water. River basins shared by more than one country cover over 45 percent of the world's land surface area. Presently, 263 trans-boundary or international river basins are being shared by two or more countries. Reservoirs of freshwater also move silently below international borders in underground aquifers. Currently, there are more than 270 known trans-boundary aquifers.
Acute shortage of water has emerged as a global phenomenon affecting almost all countries, including India and Pakistan. India is moving steadily closer to a danger zone in terms of water supply. During the last five decades, per capita availability of water in India has declined by roughly 60 per cent with an equally precipitous drop possible in the next 50 years. Meanwhile, Pakistan may be nearing “water stress” limit of 1000 cubic meters per person per year, below which serious economic and social consequences are likely.
Melting water from the Himalaya, Karakoram and Hindukush glaciers contributes more than 60 to 70 percent to the flows of the Indus River System. The agrarian economy of Pakistan – with about 90 percent of the land being arid, semi-arid or hyper-arid – depends largely on this water for irrigation.
Recent years have witnesed Pakistan raising water as a disputed issue between India and Pakistan in the context of western rivers flowing form Kashmir down to Pakistan. In order to comprehend the water diplomacy bwtween India and Pakistan, it is appropriate to briefly appraise Indus Water Treaty and Dam Projects initiated by India on western rivers in J&K.
Indus Water Treaty
In 1960, the Indus Water Treaty facilitated by the World Bank, provided the basis for dividing the waters of the Indus Basin Rivers between India and Pakistan. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) gave three eastern rivers – Ravi, Sutlej and Beas – to India and three western rivers – Sindh, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan. As an upper riparian, India is allowed specific uses of water from these rivers.
The IWT was expected to settle the water-sharing dispute between India and Pakistan, and its survival for five decades is prone to reinforce such impression. However, the IWT cannot be regarded as a success because both India and Pakistan are unhappy with the existing mechanism of allocating water under the Treaty. Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the Indus waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was a very unfair settlrment; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition were hitorically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters. Each side regards that its negotiators did a bad job.1
The differences between India and Pakistan are not about water-sharing, but about certain design and engineering features of Indian projects on the Western rivers. the Treaty allocates the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – to India and the Western rivers – the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself – to pakistan, but it allows India a limited use of the waters of the western rivers, including the generation of hydro-electric power, subject to certain fairly stringent technical conditions and stipulations. One can see how differences arise. One party can claim to be in full conformity with the conditions laid down in the Treaty, and the other party can say that this is not the case. That is exactly what has been happening.2
Pakistan being on the lower riparian on the Indus system tends to look with anxiety and suspicion at any attempts made by India to build structures on the western rivers. As structures give control, Pakistan is unwilling to agree to India acquiring a measure of control over rivers that stand allocated to Pakistan. It is fearful of the structures in question enabling India either to reduce water-flows or to release stored waters and cause floods. Pakistan’s objections are thus partly water-related and partly-security-related.
The Treaty provisions requiring India to give advance information about projects to Pakisan give the latter virtually a veto power over Indian projects on the western rivers which Pakistan, with security anxities in mind, tends to exercise in a stringent rather than accommodating manner.
In India’s opinion, Pakistan’s security fears are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself and that its capacity to reduce water flows to Pakistan is very limited. The Treaty permits structures subject to conditions that would take care of Pakistani concerns. It follows that what Pakistan can ask for is conformity to the Treaty; that would provide Pakistan the security it seeks.
Thus the Treaty did resolve the water-sharing issue, it created a potentially adversial situation in relation to the Indian use of western rivers.
Salal Dam
In the aftermath of the signing of Indus Waters Treaty, the first dispute between India and Pakistan arose over the construction of the Salal Dam by India on the Chenab River. Under the terms of the Treaty, India submitted its plan to the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan’s approval in 1968. A runof-the-river hydroelectric project, Salal was deemed crucial for the agricultural needs of the Indian Punjab and economic progress of the country. In 1974 Pakistan lodged an official objection to the design of Salal project stating that it did not conform to the criteria for design of such hydroelectric projects envisaged in the Treaty.
During the course of the negotiations, several options were discussed for reaching to a final settlement including resort to the arbitration procedure provided in the Treaty. Finally, India agreed to make some changes in the design of the dam including reducing the height of the dam and to the permanent closure of the diversion canal after the hydel plant had been commissioned.
The resolution of this dispute was hailed in both countries and is still quoted as a case of successful dilpomacy over water sharing between Pakistan and India due to the concessions made under the Salal Agreement signed in April 1978.3
Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project
In 1984 India started building the barrage and navigational project at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on the River Jhelum.India called it Tulbul Navigation Project whereas Pakistan termed it the Wullar Barrage. While opposing India plan, Pakistan in 1986 referred the case to the Indus Commission, and in 1987 work was halted on the project by India. The main point of dispute is that Pakistan views the project as a storage work while India claims that it is a navigational project. These divergent positions are further urged in the light of specific provisions of the Indus Waters Treay. For Pakistan, the project violates Article I (11) that prohibits both parties from undertaking any ‘man-made obstruction’ that may cause a change in the volume of water. Article III (4) prohibits India from storing any water on the western rivers. Further, sub-para 8 (h) entitles India to construct incidental storage work on the western rivers only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acre feet of water. Pakistan argues that the existing water level in the Wullar Lake is enough for small boats to navigate between Baramula and Srinagar, so there is no need to store additional water. It further argues that the dam’s storage capacity was 32 times more than the 10,000 maf capacity provided under the Indus Waters Treaty.4
However, India’s contention is that despite the broad principles governing the Treaty, India has been allowed, under certain conditions, to construct a barrage in the light of Article 3 (4) conditions, which are contained in Annex D and E of the Treaty. India views the project as an atempt to make the Jhelum navigable, not a reservior.
Controlling water for navigation is permissible under the Treaty. More than a dozen rounds of talks have been held to date over the construction of this barrage but it remains the oldest and longest lasting water dispute between India and Pakistan.
Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project
The Kishanganaga project constitutes another controversial water issue between India and Pakistan. The 330 MW hydroelectric project is located about 160 kilometers upstream of Muzaffarabad and involves diversion of Kishanganga or Neelum River, as is known in Pakistan, to a tributary, Bunar Madumati Nullah of the River Jhelum through a 22-kilomtre tunnel.
Pakistani objections are based on the grounds that the project will have adverse effects on the Neelam-Jhelum link project that Pakistan initiated in 1988. A second diversion of the water of Kishenganga river to Jehlum would ruin the Neelam valley in Pakistan. It is feared that the project could reduce Pakistan’s total water availability from an estimated 154 maf to about 140 maf, a shortage of about 8-9 per cent. Further, it is also expected to reduce the flow of water in the River Jhelum in Azad Kashmir by 27 per cent, affecting power generation capacity of the 1.6 billion Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project in Pakistan.5
By May 2004, India confirmed that it had started constructing some components of the project. However in April 2006, India offered to amend this project and submitted a revised plan in July 2006. In the revised plan India agreed to convert the storage and power generation project into a run-of-the-river project and construct pondage in accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty. Nonetheless, Pakistan declineed the plan on the plea that the project still had objectionable aspects. Pakistan communicated these objections to India later in a detailed report.
The issue figures on the agenda of talks every time between the two countries; however, bilateral talks have so far proved futile in reaching a settlement.
Baglihar Hydel Power Project
The Baglihar hydropower project is located on the River Chenab in Doda district of J&K. Divided into two phases, the project would install 900 MWs of electricity capacity. The design of the dam was submitted to Pakistan in 1992 and, without much delay, Pakistan protested over the design of the dam and demanded a halt to its construction. However, the construction continued as the two sides exchanged further details.
According to one expert, the Baglihar water dispute is the most specific of all these disputes between the two countries foregrounding their, fears, perceptions and dilemmas on water sharing. For the first time, the neutral expert clause in the Indus Waters Treaty was invoked. In May 2005, Raymond Lafittee, a Swiss civil engineer, was appointed by the World Bank as the neutral expert. After a detailed analysis of about 13,000 dams across the world, talks with both parties and visiting the dam site, he gave his verdict on Baglihar in February 2007. Both parties agreed to abide by the final verdict. Yet, this decision was not followed.6
Changing Tactics
For the past couple of years, Islamabad has been trying to bring water on to the agenda for future talks. In view of India’s growing criticism of Pakistan patronizing terrorist outfits against India, Pakistan is seemingly intent upon deflecting attention from the Indian focus on terrorism, and unsettle India by accusing it of wrongdoing on water. According to one India expert, Pakistan’s insistence on inclusion of water on talks’ agenda is a “dubious and dangerous move. The inclusion of water in the India-Pakistan talks might give the world the impression that water is an unresolved issue between the two countries and, worse still, that India implicitly accepts that it has given Pakistan cause for complaints about water.”7
The factual position is that India has not withheld water from Pakistan as often claimed by Islamabad. On the contrary, in early April 2010, the Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said, in an interview to a Pakistani channel that Pakistan's water woes were because of their own wastage and not because of India.
Pakistani foreign minister further stated: "The total average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acres/ft. And the water available at the farm gate is about 70 million acre/ft. Where does the 34 million acre/ft go? It's not being stolen in India. It's been wasted in Pakistan. The total average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acres/ft. And the water available at the farm gate is about 70 million acre/ft. Where does the 34 million acre/ft go? It's not being stolen in India; it's been wasted in Pakistan."8
Pakistan, which has often accused India of stealing its share of Indus waters, has said the authorities within this country have a tendency to "pass the buck" and exaggerate differences with New Delhi on the issue.
In early May 2010, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said the mismanagement in Pakistan was resulting in the loss of 34 million acre feet of water. Asserting that the average supply of water that reaches Pakistan is 104 million acre feet while the water that is consumed is 70 million acre feet, Qureshi said: "Where are the 34 million acre feet of water going? Is India stealing that water from you? No, it is not. Please do not fool yourselves. We are mismanaging that water."9
The meeting between the Indus Water Commissioners in India and Pakistan held in early June 2010 ended with no major breakthrough, except for Pakistan agreeing to India's position on Baglihar. On the other hand, Pakistan is not convinced with India's projects - Kishenganga in Kashmir valley, and Nimmo-Basgo in Ladakh. Pakistan has announced to take the issue to the neutral expert, as provided by the Indus Waters Treaty.
While Pakistan's objection towards technical issues relating to Indian projects on the Indus Rivers is understandable, the recent hostility and public animosity towards India's stance and projects is difficult to comprehend.as has been succinctly pointed out by an Indian expert: “There seems to be a carefully orchestrated strategy, whipping up public hysteria resulting in the making the people across the LoC and International Border to believe that India is 'stealing' Pakistan's waters.”10
Conclusion
Keeping in view the controversial nature of the Indus Water Treaty, some people have suggested re-negotiation. It is worth mentioning here that in any re-negotiation, both India and Pakistan would try to improve their respective positions on the western rivers, it is difficult to envisage an outcome that would be better before from points of view of both countries. The best course would perhaps be to leave things as they are and hope that with improving political relations a more reasonable and constructive spirit will prevail in the future than in the past.
Given India’s experience in dealing with Pakistan, the latter is reluctant to solve any problem and it wants to linger the same to whip up the domestic sentiments against India to divert the domestic public attention from its failures. Water is going to be an adversial issue for Pakistan to gain international sympathy and use it for whipping up public sentiments against India.
Notes
1. For more details see, www.stimson.org/rv/pdf/Ramaswamy_Iyer_Presentation.pdf
2. Ibid.
3. Adapted from Nausheen Wasi, Harnessing the Indus Waters: Perspectives from Pakistan, IPCS Issue Brief No. 128 September 2009, available at www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/IB128-Ploughshares-Nausheen.pdf .
4. Adapted from ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “Water in India-Pakistan talks”, The Hindu, 3 March 2010.
8. “Water Not Stolen in IndiaBut Wasted in Pakistan: Qureshi”, outlookindia.com, 2 April, at http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?678581 .
9. PTI, “Pakistan wastes 1/3rd of Indus water it gets, admits Qureshi”, in The Times of India, 2 may 2010.
10. D. Suba Chandran, “Waters: Is Pakistan’s game plan changing?”, The Excelsior, 14 June 2010.
President, India Water Foundation, New Delhi.
[Recent years have witnessed water emerging as a hot issue between India and Pakistan relations. Pakistan is averse to India taking advantage of Indus Rivers emanating from Kashmir by building hydro-electric dams on these rivers and accuses India of stealin water meant for Pakistan under the terms of Indus Water Treaty of 1960. India’s refutation of Pakistani allegations remain unheeded by Islamabad and it is insistent upon using water as a ‘tool’ to denounce India. Ed. ]
Water is becoming a progressively scarce and fluctuating resource in view of burgeoning population, growing food demand and climate change. Accordingly, there has been an increasing competition between countries vis-à-vis their right to water. River basins shared by more than one country cover over 45 percent of the world's land surface area. Presently, 263 trans-boundary or international river basins are being shared by two or more countries. Reservoirs of freshwater also move silently below international borders in underground aquifers. Currently, there are more than 270 known trans-boundary aquifers.
Acute shortage of water has emerged as a global phenomenon affecting almost all countries, including India and Pakistan. India is moving steadily closer to a danger zone in terms of water supply. During the last five decades, per capita availability of water in India has declined by roughly 60 per cent with an equally precipitous drop possible in the next 50 years. Meanwhile, Pakistan may be nearing “water stress” limit of 1000 cubic meters per person per year, below which serious economic and social consequences are likely.
Melting water from the Himalaya, Karakoram and Hindukush glaciers contributes more than 60 to 70 percent to the flows of the Indus River System. The agrarian economy of Pakistan – with about 90 percent of the land being arid, semi-arid or hyper-arid – depends largely on this water for irrigation.
Recent years have witnesed Pakistan raising water as a disputed issue between India and Pakistan in the context of western rivers flowing form Kashmir down to Pakistan. In order to comprehend the water diplomacy bwtween India and Pakistan, it is appropriate to briefly appraise Indus Water Treaty and Dam Projects initiated by India on western rivers in J&K.
Indus Water Treaty
In 1960, the Indus Water Treaty facilitated by the World Bank, provided the basis for dividing the waters of the Indus Basin Rivers between India and Pakistan. The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) gave three eastern rivers – Ravi, Sutlej and Beas – to India and three western rivers – Sindh, Jhelum and Chenab – to Pakistan. As an upper riparian, India is allowed specific uses of water from these rivers.
The IWT was expected to settle the water-sharing dispute between India and Pakistan, and its survival for five decades is prone to reinforce such impression. However, the IWT cannot be regarded as a success because both India and Pakistan are unhappy with the existing mechanism of allocating water under the Treaty. Many in India feel that the allocation of 80 per cent of the Indus waters to Pakistan and 20 per cent to India was a very unfair settlrment; and many in Pakistan argue that the territories that went to India under Partition were hitorically using less than 10 per cent of the Indus waters, and that the Treaty was generous to India in giving it 20 per cent of the waters. Each side regards that its negotiators did a bad job.1
The differences between India and Pakistan are not about water-sharing, but about certain design and engineering features of Indian projects on the Western rivers. the Treaty allocates the eastern rivers – Ravi, Beas and Sutlej – to India and the Western rivers – the Jhelum, the Chenab and the Indus itself – to pakistan, but it allows India a limited use of the waters of the western rivers, including the generation of hydro-electric power, subject to certain fairly stringent technical conditions and stipulations. One can see how differences arise. One party can claim to be in full conformity with the conditions laid down in the Treaty, and the other party can say that this is not the case. That is exactly what has been happening.2
Pakistan being on the lower riparian on the Indus system tends to look with anxiety and suspicion at any attempts made by India to build structures on the western rivers. As structures give control, Pakistan is unwilling to agree to India acquiring a measure of control over rivers that stand allocated to Pakistan. It is fearful of the structures in question enabling India either to reduce water-flows or to release stored waters and cause floods. Pakistan’s objections are thus partly water-related and partly-security-related.
The Treaty provisions requiring India to give advance information about projects to Pakisan give the latter virtually a veto power over Indian projects on the western rivers which Pakistan, with security anxities in mind, tends to exercise in a stringent rather than accommodating manner.
In India’s opinion, Pakistan’s security fears are misconceived as India cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself and that its capacity to reduce water flows to Pakistan is very limited. The Treaty permits structures subject to conditions that would take care of Pakistani concerns. It follows that what Pakistan can ask for is conformity to the Treaty; that would provide Pakistan the security it seeks.
Thus the Treaty did resolve the water-sharing issue, it created a potentially adversial situation in relation to the Indian use of western rivers.
Salal Dam
In the aftermath of the signing of Indus Waters Treaty, the first dispute between India and Pakistan arose over the construction of the Salal Dam by India on the Chenab River. Under the terms of the Treaty, India submitted its plan to the Permanent Indus Commission for Pakistan’s approval in 1968. A runof-the-river hydroelectric project, Salal was deemed crucial for the agricultural needs of the Indian Punjab and economic progress of the country. In 1974 Pakistan lodged an official objection to the design of Salal project stating that it did not conform to the criteria for design of such hydroelectric projects envisaged in the Treaty.
During the course of the negotiations, several options were discussed for reaching to a final settlement including resort to the arbitration procedure provided in the Treaty. Finally, India agreed to make some changes in the design of the dam including reducing the height of the dam and to the permanent closure of the diversion canal after the hydel plant had been commissioned.
The resolution of this dispute was hailed in both countries and is still quoted as a case of successful dilpomacy over water sharing between Pakistan and India due to the concessions made under the Salal Agreement signed in April 1978.3
Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project
In 1984 India started building the barrage and navigational project at the mouth of the Wullar Lake on the River Jhelum.India called it Tulbul Navigation Project whereas Pakistan termed it the Wullar Barrage. While opposing India plan, Pakistan in 1986 referred the case to the Indus Commission, and in 1987 work was halted on the project by India. The main point of dispute is that Pakistan views the project as a storage work while India claims that it is a navigational project. These divergent positions are further urged in the light of specific provisions of the Indus Waters Treay. For Pakistan, the project violates Article I (11) that prohibits both parties from undertaking any ‘man-made obstruction’ that may cause a change in the volume of water. Article III (4) prohibits India from storing any water on the western rivers. Further, sub-para 8 (h) entitles India to construct incidental storage work on the western rivers only after the design has been scrutinized and approved by Pakistan. Its storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 acre feet of water. Pakistan argues that the existing water level in the Wullar Lake is enough for small boats to navigate between Baramula and Srinagar, so there is no need to store additional water. It further argues that the dam’s storage capacity was 32 times more than the 10,000 maf capacity provided under the Indus Waters Treaty.4
However, India’s contention is that despite the broad principles governing the Treaty, India has been allowed, under certain conditions, to construct a barrage in the light of Article 3 (4) conditions, which are contained in Annex D and E of the Treaty. India views the project as an atempt to make the Jhelum navigable, not a reservior.
Controlling water for navigation is permissible under the Treaty. More than a dozen rounds of talks have been held to date over the construction of this barrage but it remains the oldest and longest lasting water dispute between India and Pakistan.
Kishanganga Hydroelectric Project
The Kishanganaga project constitutes another controversial water issue between India and Pakistan. The 330 MW hydroelectric project is located about 160 kilometers upstream of Muzaffarabad and involves diversion of Kishanganga or Neelum River, as is known in Pakistan, to a tributary, Bunar Madumati Nullah of the River Jhelum through a 22-kilomtre tunnel.
Pakistani objections are based on the grounds that the project will have adverse effects on the Neelam-Jhelum link project that Pakistan initiated in 1988. A second diversion of the water of Kishenganga river to Jehlum would ruin the Neelam valley in Pakistan. It is feared that the project could reduce Pakistan’s total water availability from an estimated 154 maf to about 140 maf, a shortage of about 8-9 per cent. Further, it is also expected to reduce the flow of water in the River Jhelum in Azad Kashmir by 27 per cent, affecting power generation capacity of the 1.6 billion Neelam-Jhelum hydropower project in Pakistan.5
By May 2004, India confirmed that it had started constructing some components of the project. However in April 2006, India offered to amend this project and submitted a revised plan in July 2006. In the revised plan India agreed to convert the storage and power generation project into a run-of-the-river project and construct pondage in accordance with the Indus Waters Treaty. Nonetheless, Pakistan declineed the plan on the plea that the project still had objectionable aspects. Pakistan communicated these objections to India later in a detailed report.
The issue figures on the agenda of talks every time between the two countries; however, bilateral talks have so far proved futile in reaching a settlement.
Baglihar Hydel Power Project
The Baglihar hydropower project is located on the River Chenab in Doda district of J&K. Divided into two phases, the project would install 900 MWs of electricity capacity. The design of the dam was submitted to Pakistan in 1992 and, without much delay, Pakistan protested over the design of the dam and demanded a halt to its construction. However, the construction continued as the two sides exchanged further details.
According to one expert, the Baglihar water dispute is the most specific of all these disputes between the two countries foregrounding their, fears, perceptions and dilemmas on water sharing. For the first time, the neutral expert clause in the Indus Waters Treaty was invoked. In May 2005, Raymond Lafittee, a Swiss civil engineer, was appointed by the World Bank as the neutral expert. After a detailed analysis of about 13,000 dams across the world, talks with both parties and visiting the dam site, he gave his verdict on Baglihar in February 2007. Both parties agreed to abide by the final verdict. Yet, this decision was not followed.6
Changing Tactics
For the past couple of years, Islamabad has been trying to bring water on to the agenda for future talks. In view of India’s growing criticism of Pakistan patronizing terrorist outfits against India, Pakistan is seemingly intent upon deflecting attention from the Indian focus on terrorism, and unsettle India by accusing it of wrongdoing on water. According to one India expert, Pakistan’s insistence on inclusion of water on talks’ agenda is a “dubious and dangerous move. The inclusion of water in the India-Pakistan talks might give the world the impression that water is an unresolved issue between the two countries and, worse still, that India implicitly accepts that it has given Pakistan cause for complaints about water.”7
The factual position is that India has not withheld water from Pakistan as often claimed by Islamabad. On the contrary, in early April 2010, the Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said, in an interview to a Pakistani channel that Pakistan's water woes were because of their own wastage and not because of India.
Pakistani foreign minister further stated: "The total average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acres/ft. And the water available at the farm gate is about 70 million acre/ft. Where does the 34 million acre/ft go? It's not being stolen in India. It's been wasted in Pakistan. The total average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acres/ft. And the water available at the farm gate is about 70 million acre/ft. Where does the 34 million acre/ft go? It's not being stolen in India; it's been wasted in Pakistan."8
Pakistan, which has often accused India of stealing its share of Indus waters, has said the authorities within this country have a tendency to "pass the buck" and exaggerate differences with New Delhi on the issue.
In early May 2010, Pakistan’s foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said the mismanagement in Pakistan was resulting in the loss of 34 million acre feet of water. Asserting that the average supply of water that reaches Pakistan is 104 million acre feet while the water that is consumed is 70 million acre feet, Qureshi said: "Where are the 34 million acre feet of water going? Is India stealing that water from you? No, it is not. Please do not fool yourselves. We are mismanaging that water."9
The meeting between the Indus Water Commissioners in India and Pakistan held in early June 2010 ended with no major breakthrough, except for Pakistan agreeing to India's position on Baglihar. On the other hand, Pakistan is not convinced with India's projects - Kishenganga in Kashmir valley, and Nimmo-Basgo in Ladakh. Pakistan has announced to take the issue to the neutral expert, as provided by the Indus Waters Treaty.
While Pakistan's objection towards technical issues relating to Indian projects on the Indus Rivers is understandable, the recent hostility and public animosity towards India's stance and projects is difficult to comprehend.as has been succinctly pointed out by an Indian expert: “There seems to be a carefully orchestrated strategy, whipping up public hysteria resulting in the making the people across the LoC and International Border to believe that India is 'stealing' Pakistan's waters.”10
Conclusion
Keeping in view the controversial nature of the Indus Water Treaty, some people have suggested re-negotiation. It is worth mentioning here that in any re-negotiation, both India and Pakistan would try to improve their respective positions on the western rivers, it is difficult to envisage an outcome that would be better before from points of view of both countries. The best course would perhaps be to leave things as they are and hope that with improving political relations a more reasonable and constructive spirit will prevail in the future than in the past.
Given India’s experience in dealing with Pakistan, the latter is reluctant to solve any problem and it wants to linger the same to whip up the domestic sentiments against India to divert the domestic public attention from its failures. Water is going to be an adversial issue for Pakistan to gain international sympathy and use it for whipping up public sentiments against India.
Notes
1. For more details see, www.stimson.org/rv/pdf/Ramaswamy_Iyer_Presentation.pdf
2. Ibid.
3. Adapted from Nausheen Wasi, Harnessing the Indus Waters: Perspectives from Pakistan, IPCS Issue Brief No. 128 September 2009, available at www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/IB128-Ploughshares-Nausheen.pdf .
4. Adapted from ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid.
7. Ramaswamy R. Iyer, “Water in India-Pakistan talks”, The Hindu, 3 March 2010.
8. “Water Not Stolen in IndiaBut Wasted in Pakistan: Qureshi”, outlookindia.com, 2 April, at http://news.outlookindia.com/item.aspx?678581 .
9. PTI, “Pakistan wastes 1/3rd of Indus water it gets, admits Qureshi”, in The Times of India, 2 may 2010.
10. D. Suba Chandran, “Waters: Is Pakistan’s game plan changing?”, The Excelsior, 14 June 2010.
Thankyou very much
ReplyDeleteSent from my BlackBerry® wireless device
Mr. Vincent J. Pala
Hon'ble Minister of State for Water Resources
Government of India
215, Shram Shakti Bhawan, Rafi Marg, New Delhi-110001
Dear Sir,
ReplyDeleteI agree with the contents and other details provided by you in your article, particularly the conclusion drawn as there may not be any better option with Pakistan other than suggested by you.
regards
Bhishm Kumar